Wage Frontiers in Pre and Post-crisis Spain: Implications for Welfare and Inequality by Bashford Fernández, Joanna María & Rodríguez Álvarez, Ana María
1 
 
Wage Frontiers in Pre & Post-Crisis Spain:  
Implications for Welfare and Inequality.  
 
 
Joanna María Bashford Fernández 
Oviedo Efficiency Group, University of Oviedo 
bashfordjoanna.uo@uniovi.es 
 
Ana Rodríguez-Álvarez* 
Oviedo Efficiency Group, University of Oviedo 
ana@uniovi.es 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores the evolution of wages in Spain using a stochastic frontier approach (SFA) to 
estimate the wage frontiers of workers in Spain as a function of their human capital (education, 
experience and occupation), year and region. Once the wage frontier has been estimated an 
analysis is made of determinants (type of contract, economic cycle, gender and region), which 
may contribute to the workers having difficulties in achieving their maximum attainable potential 
salary. Given our specific interest in comparing wages before and after the crisis, we monitor the 
effect on hourly wage of changes in the level of Spanish Gross Domestic Product for the period 
2004-2015. For this purpose, a panel data model (Greene, 2005) is used to estimate the stochastic 
frontier. The data is obtained from the Spanish Living Conditions Survey. Coinciding with three 
waves (2004-2007, 2008-2011 and 2012-2015) of the SCLS, our database conveniently 
encompasses differing economic cycles for estimation. Results show that the difficulty of workers 
in achieving their potential wage is greater at the end of the post-crisis period than the pre-crisis 
period. Whilst serving to throw some light on the potential and real wages available to Spanish 
workers before and after the onset of the economic crisis, the paper also offers a brief glimpse of 
the effect on individual welfare and evidence of an increasing trend in inequality in the post-crisis 
period. 
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1. Introduction 
The objective of this paper is to explore the evolution of wages in Spain over the period 2004-
2015. More precisely, the data used compares said evolution over three specific periods which 
because of their cyclical nature prove of great interest for study; 2004-2007 (pre-economic crisis), 
2008-2011(economic crisis) and 2012-2015 (post-economic crisis). 
When referring to wages, the idea is to apply a stochastic frontier technique to measure the 
differences that arise between a potential wage, i.e. the one that should be obtained for an 
individual with particular socio-economic characteristics given his/her investment in human 
capital and the wage actually obtained by said individual in each regional labour market. In 
tandem, this offers a measure of the distance to the stochastic frontier which grants us an idea of 
how difficult it is for an individual to attain his/her maximum wage. 
To analyse the difference between actual and potential wages for individuals over a twelve-year 
period, we estimate a standard Mincer equation for average hourly wage which incorporates 
human capital variables such as experience, education and occupation. On the other hand, and in 
order to explain the distance to the wage frontier, Gross Domestic Product (henceforth GDP) is 
included with a view to explaining the difficulty that individuals may face in attaining their 
maximum potential wage. Jointly with GDP we include gender, type of contract and region. 
One of the key elements of our model is the presence of a variable for GDP, the latter being 
commonly recognised as one of the primary indicators of variations in a country´s economic cycle. 
Here we monitor it for Spain with interesting results, that serve to ratify the presence of a 
worldwide phenomenon more pronounced in developed countries related to individual welfare 
and inequality which we discuss in more detail below. The study of wages has received in the past 
and continues to attract numerous and diverse studies in academic and institutional circles.  
As shown by the International Labour Organization (henceforth ILO), in their 2014-15 edition of 
the “Global Wage Report”1, wages constitute the largest single source of income for households 
with at least one member of working age in most countries. They also point out that changes in 
wages and paid employment appear to be the key factors underlying recent trends in inequality. 
In global terms, the ILO indicates that wage growth has stagnated even lagging behind pre-crisis 
rates particularly in the case of developed countries. Verdugo (2016) who studies 8 Eurozone 
countries before and after the Great Recession, reveals that even with a constant labour force 
composition in terms of education and experience, those countries particularly affected by the 
crisis (such as Spain) experienced a significant decrease in average wages during the downturn.  
The ILO also report that labour productivity – the value of goods and services produced per 
person employed – continues to outstrip wage growth in developed economies such as Germany, 
Japan and the United States, this phenomenon continuing a longer trend which briefly paused 
only during the financial crisis years of 2008 and 2009. The growing gap between wages and 
productivity has translated into a declining share of GDP going to labour while an increasing share 
goes to capital, especially in developed economies.  
This trend means that workers and their households are getting a smaller share of economic 
growth and in consequence experience a reduction in welfare. As the ILO suggests in their report, 
many developed countries such as the United States or the United Kingdom considered as “strong 
economies” with sound economic indicators in terms of for example GDP, are now, precisely those 
where individual welfare and equality appear to be following a declining path. Similar concerns 
to the ILO have been expressed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in their 2017 World 
                                                          1 Global Wage Report 2014/15 published by the International Labour Organization at http://www.ilo.org/global/research/global-reports/global-wage-report/2014/lang--en/index.htm 
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Economic Outlook report2 and even more recently by the Centre for Economic Policy Research 
(CEPR) in a study on the United Kingdom.3  
Our paper attempts to study regional wages against the backdrop of the aforementioned scenario 
and in doing so hopes to throw some light on the potential and real wages available to Spanish 
workers before and after the onset of the economic crisis.  This in turn offers a brief glimpse of 
the effects on individual welfare.  
Moreover, given the high heterogeneity of production structures and labour markets across 
regions in Spain (for example, more than 60% of covered workers have their wages set by regional 
agreements), the regional aspect is of particular interest to policy makers given the indirect 
implications for re-location of industries and jobs within and outside Spain on a more global scale. 
Because of this, our analysis also focuses on differences in hourly wages at regional level. On the 
other hand, Governmental Labour Reforms in 2012 may have altered in part the foregoing wage 
structure. Given that our study covers the years 2004 to 2015, the Spanish wage evolution during 
this period could prove relevant.     
Our contribution is twofold. On the one hand, we extend the wage frontier analysis to cover a 
longer period of study to observe the evolution of regional wages over three interesting cyclical 
periods 2004-2007 (pre-crisis), 2008-2011 (crisis) and 2012-2015 (post-crisis) using the 
harmonized European survey for Spanish Living Conditions. On the other hand, the methodology 
we apply in this study (a panel data using true-random effects, Greene, 2005 model) permits us 
to capture unobservable heterogeneity at an individual (worker) level in an adequate way.  
Section 2 is dedicated to a literature review. Section 3 describes the theoretical Model for the 
stochastic frontier Mincer equation. Section 4 develops our empirical panel data model. Section 
5 discusses the survey, panel data and variables used. Section 6 analyses the results in three sub-
sections. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review  
In terms of labour economics, the study of wages both at microeconomic and macroeconomic 
level has attracted numerous and diverse studies in the economic literature, both in terms of the 
aspects considered and the empirical treatment granted.  
The explanation of differences in wages and observed earnings has traditionally been linked to 
human capital theory, with papers using as an initial springboard the base equation described in 
the seminal work of Mincer (1974).  Our literature review starts with an analysis of the Mincerian 
studies and continues with a revision of those international papers using stochastic frontier 
analysis to study wage differentials, concluding with a more in-depth look at the studies using this 
methodology for Spain. 
Sanroma and Ramos (1999) using the Survey of family budgets (INE4) for 1990-91 conduct one 
of the first studies to analyse inter-regional wage differences for 50 Spanish provinces, discovering 
a high degree of heterogeneity. By means of an enlarged Mincerian equation, they study the 
magnitude of the “territorial effect” on wages. After controlling for individual and job 
characteristics, they attribute the still substantial provincial wage differentials to the unequal level 
of prices and the irregular distribution of unemployment between provinces, which is shown to 
                                                          
2 International Monetary Fund (2017), World Economic Outlook, October, “Seeking Sustainable Growth: Short-Term Recovery, Long-Term Challenges”. Chapter 2: “Recent Wage Dynamics in Advanced Economies: Drivers and Implications”. 3 Weisbrot and Merling (2018). “The UK Economy at the Crossroads”. Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) reports at: http://cepr.net/publications/reports/the-uk-economy-at-the-crossroads 
4 Instituto Nacional de Estadística (The National Statistics Institute), Spain.  
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have a negative effect on wages close to the magnitude estimated by Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1994). 
The paper of García and Molina (2002) also analyses the wage differentials between different 
Spanish regions using cross-sectional data for 1994 corresponding to the European Community 
Household Panel (henceforth ECHP). Hedonic wage equations and wage decomposition method 
are applied, which allows separation of the effects due to characteristics from those due to returns. 
Results appear to indicate that the bulk of the gender gap is actually due to differences in the 
endowments of productive characteristics between males and females but that unobservable 
factors are also responsible for an important portion of the gap (local labour market conditions, 
productive structure and demographic factors). The variables that exert greatest influence on the 
characteristic differences are seniority, possessing a university degree, the command of a second 
language, the sector of activity, the supervisory tasks undertaken and the occupation. With respect 
to the different returns, the largest differences correspond to remuneration for seniority, a second 
language, the sector of activity, the working hours and discrimination by gender. 
The article of Simón et al (2006) studies the importance of labour market institutions and in 
particular, collective wage bargaining in shaping regional wage differences in the Spanish labour 
market. Using microdata from the Spanish Structure of Earnings Survey (henceforth SSES), for 
1995 published by INE, their results reveal that there are significant inter-regional wage 
differences for similarly skilled workers. These differences exist throughout the entire wage 
structure and can be explained by competitive and non- competitive factors, such as an 
insufficient competition in product markets. In this context, industry-level collective bargaining 
plays a major role in accounting for regional wage differences in Spain. 
García-Perez and Jimeno (2007) also use the ECHP for the period 1995-2001 to study public 
sector wage gaps in Spanish regions. Again, they apply a traditional Mincerian approach to their 
wage equations for the public and private sector where the dependent variable is the set of 
observable determinants of wages. Results show that sizeable public-sector wage differences exist 
among regions that are largely attributable to differences in returns and to a lesser extent to 
differences and selection effects. Regional differences in public sector wage gaps vary across 
gender, educational levels and occupations and appear to be correlated positively with the level 
of regional unemployment and negatively with regional labour productivity. 
López-Bazo and Motellón (2012), use micro-level data from the extended year 2000 Spanish 
sample of the ECHP and a Mincerian wage equation to assess the effect of human capital on 
regional wage differentials. The results for the set of Spanish regions in the form of Autonomous 
Communities (NUTS 2) confirm that they differ in the endowment of human capital, but also that 
the return that individuals obtain from it varies sharply across regions. Regional heterogeneity in 
returns is especially intense in the case of education, particularly when considering its effect on 
the employability of individuals. These differences in endowment and, especially, in returns to 
human capital, account for a significant proportion of regional wage gaps. 
Coinciding with the present paper, Hernández and Serrano (2012) use the first wave of the Living 
Conditions Survey (2004 to 2009), albeit with different methodology to our study, to examine the 
effect of over-education and its effects on regional wages in Spain. They analyse the wage gaps by 
region by way of standard Mincer equations, quantile regressions and the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition. Their findings indicate that a 28% difference exists between the gross hourly wage 
of overqualified and well-matched employees, with 25 percentage points corresponding to 
individual characteristics and the remaining 3 percentage points to characteristics and the firms 
in which they are employed. 
A more recent study of Murillo-Huertas et al (2017), examines regional differences in the gender 
wage gap in Spain using matched employer–employee microdata (from the 2002, 2006 and 2010 
waves of the SSES), two different econometric decomposition methods and panel data techniques. 
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Their findings suggest that Spain shows a significant regional heterogeneity in the size of the raw 
gap, roughly comparable to cross-country differences observed in the European context. The 
results from the decomposition analysis show that although the bulk of the gender wage gap in 
Spanish regions is due to differences in the endowments of productive characteristics between 
males and females there is still a substantial part of the gap that remains unexplained. The 
analysis of the causes behind the variation of both, the raw and the unexplained gender wage gap 
by region highlights that several economic, institutional and demographic elements identified in 
previous studies analysing international differences in the gender wage gap are also relevant to 
explain regional differences in the gender wage gap in Spain. 
As already mentioned, the focus of this paper is on the estimation of wage frontiers or potential 
wages for individuals across Spain using Stochastic Frontier Analysis, a technique initially 
developed by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977). At the outset, this 
methodology was applied to study the technical efficiency of firms in different industries although 
alternative proposals emerged in the fields of health, education and rapidly extended to labour 
economics amongst others. 
Amongst the former studies and building upon Mincer (1974), a valuable and innovative 
extension to the labour economics literature on earnings is offered by Lovell (2001) who proposes 
the use of production frontier methodology. The latter involves the estimation of an earnings or 
wage frontier which represents the maximum attainable wage, based on an individual’s own 
human capital endowments as well as a series of other individual and market characteristics that 
may influence earnings. This maximum potential wage constitutes an upper frontier of 
observations where some individuals will actually manage to reach their frontier whilst others fail 
to do so positioning themselves below it. The distance to the frontier indicates how far a worker 
is from their potential wage, after having taken into consideration individual or group 
characteristics. Furthermore, Lovell (1995) also points out that when a difference between 
potential and observed wage exists but fails to be taken into account, the estimation of parameters 
describing technology will be biased. The upshot of the latter is that the information derived via 
the estimation of wage frontiers tends to prove more accurate than those studies based on the use 
of average functions. 
The difference or gap between the actual and estimated frontier wage is a residual term usually 
assumed as inefficiency in the job search process, such as incomplete information and research 
costs. In this regard, Polachek and Robst (1998), among others, reveal a consistency between the 
inefficiency scores obtained via the estimation of the wage frontier and the direct measure of 
labour market knowledge exhibited by the individuals searching for a job in the study. Similarly, 
Hofler and Polacheck (1985) employ this method for the first time to study the existence of 
imperfect information and measured its effect on workers’ actual wages. Hofler and Murphy 
(1992) again apply this technique in a discussion about “underpayment” in the job market.  
Aside from the afore-mentioned job search inefficiencies, the aspect which appears to have 
attracted the greatest wave of studies is the pay gap caused by differences in race, gender, 
nationality, demographic/ socio-economic status and education. In an international context, 
some pioneering papers using stochastic frontier analysis to highlight this issue include papers by 
Robinson and Wunnava (1989), Hunt-McCool and Warren (1993), Croppenstedt and Meschi 
(1997), Polachek and Robst (1998), Dawson et al (2001), Salas and Contreras (2003), Lang 
(2005), Adamchik and King (2007) or Jensen et al. (2010). 
 In the context of our area of interest, namely the Spanish labour market, relevant studies on wage 
discrimination by gender using stochastic frontier analysis include Díaz and Sánchez (2011) with 
the more recent contributions of García-Prieto and Gómez-Castilla (2017) and Perez-Villadóniga 
and Rodriguez-Álvarez (2017a,2017b). 
Several of the aforementioned studies are described in more detail below. 
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Various studies adopt stochastic frontier methodology to analyse individual country wage 
structures, focusing frequently in recent years on efficiency or gender aspects of regional wage 
distributions. For example, Croppenstedt and Meschi (1997) use a random coefficient approach 
to estimate frontier earnings functions by gender, marital status and north-south location in order 
to generate estimates of wage discrimination in Italy. Although overall discrimination is 
ambiguous they attribute this to a counter-veiling effect of education and tenure. Most married 
women from the south with secondary or university education are employed in public 
administration where they are relatively better paid. Results indicate that education rather than 
the sector of activity is responsible for removing discrimination. A crowding-in hypothesis is also 
revealed whereby southern-married males earn less if they work in sectors with greater female 
presence. 
Salas and Contreras (2003), conduct a stochastic frontier approach to estimate efficiency 
measures of the transformation of human capital into earnings in the labour market of Chile for 
the period 1957-1998. They attribute a mean efficiency of 75% to the period and an improvement 
in the levels of efficiency over time. Interestingly, they monitor the co-movements of the rate of 
growth of GDP and inefficiencies for the years studied in a similar way to the present study which, 
as explained further on, considers the evolution of GDP and mean efficiency for the period 2004-
2015.  
Using the argument that human capital endowments identify earning potentials rather than 
actual earnings, Lang (2005) uses a stochastic frontier approach to analyse systematic differences 
in wages between immigrant and native workers in Germany in terms of distance to the frontier. 
Using the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) Data of the year 2000, the study reveals that 
both groups, natives and immigrants, are in fact at about the same distance from the frontier and 
he concludes that human capital differentials are the most important source of wage inequality.  
Adamchik and King (2007), in turn, apply a stochastic frontier approach in order to analyse 
labour market efficiency in Poland with wage efficiency defined as the ratio of a worker´s actual 
and potential (maximum wage), given his or her demographic and socio-economic characteristics. 
Their study indicates that in 2001 using data based on the Labour Force Survey conducted by the 
Polish Central Statistical Office in May of the same year, on average, full-time hired polish workers 
realized 86% of their potential earnings. Whilst the identification of the determinants of wage 
efficiency produced mixed results they concluded that worker performance in Poland is rewarded 
appropriately by a standard of wage efficiency close to the wage frontier.  
Drawing international comparisons, Díaz and Sánchez (2011), analyse the gender wage gap in 
Germany, France, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom. With data from the ECHP database covering 
the period 1995-2001 the authors adopt a stochastic frontier approach to study the wage 
differentials due to gender, after controlling for human capital and other individual 
characteristics. The authors found support for wage discrimination against women. The results 
show that a significant part of the gender wage gap in all the countries analysed is not attributable 
to differences in human capital endowment or personal and job-related characteristics. For Spain, 
results reveal a potential female wage which is circa 34% lower than that of males marking a 
notably greater wage gender gap than for the other countries studied. 
Applying a stochastic frontier technique, Contreras et al (2016), conduct a similar analysis to 
measure the differences that arise between the potential wage, the one that should be obtained 
for an individual with particular socio-economic characteristics given his/her investment in 
human capital and the wage actually obtained in the labour market. Once more the data comes 
from the ECHP for the same period 1995-2001 but only three of the previous study’s object 
countries Germany, United Kingdom and Spain are considered. Here the results indicate that 
geographical mobility enables men to get closer to their potential wage whereas for women job 
mobility is influenced by personal and household-related factors which tend to move them away 
from their potential wage. 
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Fewer studies adopt stochastic frontier techniques to study wages focusing only on Spain.  
Ahamdanech-Zarco et al (2009) study Spanish labour market efficiency during the period 1995-
2002, marked by labour market reforms and high, but rapidly declining unemployment. Using a 
stochastic frontier model with data from the Wage Structure Survey they find that female workers, 
temporary workers, immigrants, the unskilled, service workers, and older workers are relatively 
inefficient in capturing the returns to their human capital. Overall, the authors reveal a uniform 
reduction in labour market efficiency between 1995 and 2002. 
Ahamdanech-Zarco et al (2011) examines wage inequality in the Spanish labour market from a 
regional perspective, drawing on stochastic dominance techniques. The field of study is of 
particular interest because wage determination in Spain incorporates an important territorial 
component, facilitated by certain specific institutional elements, given that Spain is one of the few 
developed countries in which collective bargaining is mainly developed through industry-wide 
agreements on an infra-national scale applied exclusively to provinces or regions. The main 
empirical findings are that wage inequality exhibits significant regional heterogeneity and that 
both regional differences in workforce heterogeneity and the mix of jobs and workplaces and 
differences in their wage returns are influential factors in the explanation of regional 
heterogeneity in the levels of wage inequality. Additionally, in Spain the regional dimension of 
collective bargaining at industry level implies the presence of wage determination mechanisms 
that are differentiated by region, which in turn give rise to the existence of significant differences 
in regional wage structures. 
García-Prieto and Gomez-Castilla (2017) explore gender wage discrimination in Spain and its link 
to education using a stochastic frontier approach to show that gender discrimination is found to 
be a less serious problem for more highly educated women. The stochastic frontier approach is 
employed to measure wage discrimination against women using Spanish data from the European 
Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions. The afore-mentioned technique allows the 
authors to split the gender wage gap of workers displaying the same characteristics into two 
components: the first measures inefficiency in the job search process caused by imperfect 
information or gender differences concerning preferences regarding working conditions, whereas 
the second takes account of discrimination. The study reveals a significant level of discrimination 
in the Spanish labour market at all educational levels, but this problem is quantitatively more 
pronounced in the case of less-educated workers, with lower gender discrimination for highly 
educated women. 
Using a stochastic frontier model, Perez-Villadóniga and Rodriguez-Álvarez (2017a), analyse 
wage differentials for those workers wishing to maximize the return to human capital investment. 
They propose a new theoretical model where it is the workers themselves who decide the amount 
they wish to invest in human capital, taking into account the costs of acquiring those skills, for the 
purpose of maximizing earnings. The empirical implementation of their theoretical model allows 
the authors, under certain assumptions, to obtain consistent estimates even under the assumption 
of endogeneity. They present an empirical application to the education sector using data from the 
Spanish Structure of Earnings Survey 2010. Their results reveal that females and workers in the 
private education sector face more difficulties in achieving their maximum potential wage. 
Perez-Villadóniga and Rodriguez-Álvarez (2017b) again use a stochastic frontier approach to 
measure the gender gap, both in terms of gross wages and the specific salary component in the 
form of the base wage, determined by collective bargaining. The wage frontier estimated with data 
from the 2010 Spanish Structure of Earnings Survey analyses the difference between workers’ 
observed wages and their potential wage, given human capital endowments, as well as firm 
characteristics. Additionally, the distance to the frontier is measured as a function of workers’ 
gender, to test whether women fail to achieve potential wages to any great extent.  
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3. A Model for the stochastic frontier Mincer equation. 
Aigner et al (1977) consider the fact that the frontier itself might be stochastic. In particular, as 
explained in more detail below, the stochastic frontier is modelled with a composite disturbance 
term in the earnings equation. One component of this disturbance is assumed to be normally 
distributed with zero mean and represents the specification and measurement error, and the 
other component is assumed to be a random variable with a non- positive distribution. In other 
words, apart from the term measuring the distance to the frontier, stochastic frontiers include a 
random error component, which permits the incorporation of the statistical noise common to 
economic data (see for example, Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000).   
In this paper, we follow the Mincer (1974) approach, where we denote f(M) as the Mincer equation 
which relates human capital and wages. The human capital endowment is the key element for the 
study of wage formation in a competitive market (Mincer, 1970, 1974, Blaug, 1976, Becker, 1993). 
In order to explain wages, Mincer introduces human capital by way of education (more education 
implying a higher wage) and work experience (expecting a parabolic relationship with wages, that 
is, that the latter increase with work experience to a maximum at which point they start to 
decline). This is due to the fact that at the start, work experience allows workers to improve their 
productivity at an increasing rate until a moment is reached when human capital tends to 
accumulate at a lower rate than its depreciation, thus permitting a possible fall in wages. For this 
reason, the Mincer wage equations include both variables, work experience and the same variable 
squared (with the expected sign to be positive in the former case and negative in the latter case). 
The object of the present study is to estimate a Mincer function applying frontier techniques. In 
order to explain the Mincer-based stochastic frontier equation, an inequality is used which allows 
the differentiation of observed and maximum (or potential) wage over time in the following 
manner: 
                           (1) 
Where W are actual or observed earnings; A is a constant;  is the Mincer function 
where β is a set of parameters to be estimated; i are individuals (workers) and t is time. 
 
 In order to contrast the model, the aforementioned inequality is transformed into an equality: 
 
                           (2) 
Where the error term has two components: the term, which is a random disturbance 
term and , that allows the observed wage of any worker to fall short of the maximum potential 
wage level (the negative sign means that all workers have to be on the frontier or below it). This 
potential wage is determined not by the deterministic Mincer function frontier  
but by the stochastic wage frontier . In this way, random differences 
(captured by vi) are not confused with systematic differences between potential and observed 
wages (captured by uit).   
By rearranging Equation (2) we obtain the efficiency of the individual in obtaining his/her 
potential wage: 
                                     (3) 
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),( ititMf β
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A f M vβ
= − = itEFF
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Where EFFit= indicates the difference between the observed and the potential 
wage for worker i in the period t, that is to say, the efficiency term that takes values between 0 and 
1, given that  is non-negative. 
Once logarithms of Equation (2) are taken, we obtain: 
             (4)  
Where β0=ln A. 
 
Our empirical panel data model is developed in the next section. 
 
4.Empirical Panel Data Model 
In line with the literature available on frontier analysis, the present paper uses a panel data model 
approach based on Greene (2005) to define a Mincer (1974) equation via the estimation of a time-
varying stochastic frontier Normal-Half Normal model with unit-specific intercepts for each of 
the three 4 year cycles. This particular specification allows separating time-varying inefficiency 
from unit specific time invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Because of this, Greene terms these 
models as “true” fixed (TFE) or random-effects (TRE), based on certain assumptions related to 
unobserved unit-specific heterogeneity, TRE being the model chosen for this paper. Moreover, we 
allow heteroscedasticity in the variance of the error term. To do this, we employ an empirical 
specification based on the models of Caudill and Ford (1993), Caudill et al (1995) and Hadri 
(1999). 
Developing the Mincer Equation (4), formally we finally have: 
 
ln𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽11(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇
𝑖𝑖+1+ � 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −10
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂=2
17
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴=2
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
               (5) 
s.t.   
                                                           (6) 
                                                              (7)
                                                         (8) 
                                    (9) 
 
Where W = the hourly wage of the individual, i = individual, t= time (t=2004…2015), Exp = work 
experience in years, , Ed =education in years. We have 
exp( )itu−
itu
0ln ( , )it it it it itW f M v uβ β= + + −
2 )it vitv Ν σ∼ (0,
+ 2
it uitu Ν σ∼ (0, )
2 exp( ,uit iσ φ= )
'h
( , , , )i cont gender ACD D D GDP=
'h
2 2( ) = (work exp erience in years)Exp
10 
 
included dummies: ; DAC= the 17 Autonomous Communities of Spain 
dummies and DOcc = the type of occupation. In Equation (9) we have also included 
(temporary or fixed), Dgender and GDP =gross domestic product of 
Spain.  
As we have already explained, the error term has two components: the term , which is a 
normally distributed random disturbance term representing measurement and specification 
error, and a one-sided disturbance , representing worker inefficiency. The latter allows the 
observed wage of any worker to fall short of the maximum potential wage level (the negative sign 
meaning that all individuals have to be on the frontier or below it).  
, the hourly wage of individual i at time t, depends on the individual´s human capital 
endowments. In order to proxy human capital and hence, productivity, the individual´s education 
(Ed), experience in the labour market (Exp) and the latter`s square, are included. Moreover, 
occupational dummies which are especially relevant to proxy worker´s productivity are included 
for 10 basic occupational categories. Regional dummies are included to capture the effect which 
the characteristics of a particular Autonomous Community may have on an individual’s wage. 
Finally, the time dummies will pick up the effect on wages that are characteristics specific to each 
year, these remaining constant over each four-year cycle. 
With reference to equations (8) and (9) these reflect an approach used by the authors previously 
cited which analyses the effects of several determinants on the variance of the u term. Thus, this 
model allows heteroscedasticity in . In this paper, the determinants (here, type of contract, 
GDP, gender and Autonomous Communities) of inefficiency  are included in vector 
(equation 9) following the formulation of Caudill and Ford (1993) and Caudill et al (1995). In this 
way, we incorporate a dummy related to the type of contract, fixed indefinite or temporary, given 
that this may affect the hourly wage of an individual. Gross domestic product is included to 
capture the cycle. On the other hand, we include gender because due to social and cultural 
constraints, it is possible that women perform worse than men in terms of achieving their 
potential wage. Lastly, we have also included regional dummies in Equation (9) to explain 
differences among regions. 
 
5. Data  
We use data from the 2004-2015 waves of the Spanish Living Conditions Survey (SLCS). The 
SLCS is a relatively new source of statistical information in the European Union that strengthens 
the current European statistical infrastructure as a response to the Commission’s needs to obtain 
initial information on the distribution of income and social exclusion in Europe. In doing so it 
acts as a base for the formulation of its social policy in different spheres, and assists monitoring 
the effects of these policies in the whole of the European Union (EU). Between 1994 and 2001, 
the European Union Household Panel (EUHP) survey had satisfied these political needs. 
Nevertheless, given the need to update its content in view of the new demands, and to improve its 
functioning (especially as regards the speed at which data is produced), the EUHP was replaced 
with the SLCS. The target population comprises persons who are members of private households 
living in mainly family dwellings. Although persons of all ages are part of the target population, 
all persons are not exhaustively researched since those selected must be aged 16 or over on 
December 31st of the year prior to the interview in order to respond to the questionnaire. This 
survey contains personal and labour market characteristics, such as wage, hours worked, age and 
occupation among other variables. Also, the survey chooses an independent and representative 
= time dummy by yeartD
= type of  contract dummyContD
itv
itu
itW
itu
2
uitσ i
'h
11 
 
sample for each region (in Spain, Autonomous Community) which is an important feature of the 
survey in terms of our own objectives. 
The data is available from the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE), with specific use being 
made of the longitudinal microdata files for wave 2004-2007 and wave 2008-2011 (both base 
2004) and 2012-2015 (base 2013)5. The datasets used for the estimation include 59,973 
observations for the period 2004-2015. In terms of the data, as far as we are aware, this is the first 
paper to use this data for the methodology proposed (see Section 5 below) and over the three 4-
year wave periods. Our descriptive statistics are shown in Table I. 
Our dependent variable is gross hourly wage. We proxy human capital by means of experience, 
education and occupation. Potential labour experience may be estimated as the difference 
between the age of the employee and the age at which he/she commences work. As regards 
education, we have detailed information on workers’ highest successfully completed level of 
education, which is then transformed into years of schooling. Hence, education is a proxy for the 
number of years corresponding to the highest level of education completed by each worker. 
Moreover, in addition to education and experience, the model incorporates occupation as an 
additional proxy to the human capital endowment of workers. 
Our continuous variables include gross hourly wage per hour, work experience, years of education 
and GDP, the latter reflecting the % change for the Spanish economy for the period studied. Gross 
hourly wage in euros ranges from a minimum of 0.043 in the first wave to 0.01 in the last wave. 
Notably however, the opposite is true for the maximum hourly wage which stood at 231.94 euros 
in the first wave, ending at 341.20 euros in the last wave. Over the period the maximum individual 
work experience declines from 63 years for the period 2004-2007 to 59 years for the period 2012-
2015. Maximum years of education stand at 19 years for each panel.   
We include a set of dummies for time, region and occupation. On a regional basis, the % share of 
the individuals included in each survey by Autonomous Community is by wave similar with the 
exception of Madrid in the first period that has a 7% share of the survey compared with circa 12% 
in the next two waves. In terms of gender, the share of individuals is between 52 and 58% for men 
and between 42% and 48% participation for women. For the period fixed indefinite contracts for 
individuals interviewed ranged from between 73% to 79% of total contracts whilst temporary 
contracts constituted from between 20% to 27%. With respect to the occupations of interviewees, 
the mix changes over the 12-year period. Whilst in the first wave of the survey group 7 
representing Craft and related trade workers was the largest group, in the second wave the 
largest occupational group is group 2 representing Professionals. In the third wave of the survey 
the largest occupational group is group 5 comprising Services and Sales workers. An explanation 
of the ISCO-08 international classification provided by the International Labour Organization 
and used by the survey as well as our own classification for estimation purposes is provided in 
table 1f. 
 
6.Results 
a) Results for the stochastic frontier Mincer Equation (see Table II)   
The results have been obtained via the econometric package Stata 14. The estimates of the Mincer 
equations are shown in Table I, with a brief review of the results as follows. 
                                                          5 Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Living Conditions Survey/Results/Microdata/Longitudinal files base 2004 and 2013.  http://www.ine.es/dyngs/INEbase/en/operacion.htm?c=Estadistica_C&cid=1254736176807&menu=resultados&secc=1254736195153&idp=1254735976608   
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In terms of Exp, which is in reality a semi-elasticity of how wages vary with changes in work 
experience, the coefficients are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for each of the 
three panels, albeit exhibiting a similar trend for the pre-crisis and crisis waves and a drastic 
decline in the post-crisis period. This means that increasing work experience by one year served 
to boost an individual`s wage by 2.24% in the period 2004-2007, 2.23% in 2008-2011 and by a 
much smaller increase of 0.78% in the period 2012-2015. The latter result may reflect the fact that 
despite Spain´s emergence from the crisis wages have not recuperated and possessing work 
experience has a more diluted effect on individual wages. 
Likewise, the variable reflects the fact that an additional year of work experience increases 
wages. The first two waves exhibit negative coefficients which are statistically significant at the 
1% level for each panel. For the period 2012-2015 the coefficient is zero and statistically 
insignificant. 
As expected the coefficients for the variable Ed are positive and significant at the 1% level for each 
period. In the pre-crisis period 2004-2007 an additional year of education boosted an individual’s 
wage by 2.34%, with a slightly smaller increase of 2.28% registered in the period coinciding with 
the crisis. It is worth mentioning that the middle wave is likely to offer mixed results given that it 
incorporates the years of the slump and the partial recovery of late 2010. The most salient result 
is that for the period 2012-2015 which whilst bearing a positive coefficient, indicates a reward to 
wages based on an additional year of education, of only 1.53%. The latter period is noteworthy for 
the major labour reform exercised by the Spanish Government in mid-2012 which together with 
the high level of unemployment may have served to reduce wages. 
The coefficients of the time dummies (all significant at the 1% level) reflect differing tendencies 
depending on the cycle. During the pre-crisis cycle salaries display an increasing trend i.e. in 2007 
salaries increased 11.56% with respect to the base year 2004. In the second period, and with 
respect to the base year 2008, we observe an increase of 2.27% and 6.63% for the years 2009 and 
2010 respectively, closing the cycle with a smaller increase of 4.73% in 2011. In contrast to what 
one might expect in a period of economic recuperation, the wage scenario in the third cycle sees 
a serious reverse with respect to the base year 2012 with salaries decreasing by 4.25% and 3.56% 
and 2.59% respectively in 2013, 2014 and 2015. Coinciding with an upturn in Spain´s GDP, 2013 
appears to signal a deceleration of this downward wage movement.       
Given the heterogeneity of Spain Autonomous Communities we consider appropriate the 
inclusion of regional dummies representing the latter in order to capture these differences in the 
model. The estimation was made using Madrid as the reference Autonomous Community. 
Regional results indicate that the Foral Community of Navarra is the only region which registered 
higher wages than Madrid in the period 2004-2007 with a positive coefficient of 0.11 statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Catalonia bears a negative coefficient of 0.0048 which given its non-
significance suggests that the wage differential between their Autonomous Community and 
Madrid is negligible (similar results being obtained in the second and third cycles). A comparable 
situation exists for Cantabria, the Basque country and Balearic Islands with small positive 
coefficients which lack statistical significance. During the 2008-2011 wave, the Basque country 
and the Foral Community of Navarra registered higher wages than Madrid and in the period 2012-
2015, they are joined by Asturias and Castile and Leon (all four coefficients proving positive and 
statistically significant).  
In terms of the regions with the lowest wages with respect to Madrid, Galicia, Extremadura and 
the Canary Islands are the worst performers over the 2004-2015 period. In the aftermath of the 
economic crisis, there is a weak recuperation in salaries with respect to those registered for 
Madrid in the period 2004-2007. However, nine of the Autonomous Communities Galicia, 
Aragon, Castile-La Mancha, Extremadura, Community of Valencia, Balearic Islands, Andalusia, 
Murcia and Canary Islands still offer lower hourly wages (i.e. lower stochastic wage frontiers 
2( )Exp
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compared to that for Madrid) to individuals (with similar education, work experience) living in 
their respective regions than during the cycle of the economic crisis. 
In terms of occupational dummies, our calculations for the Mincer equations are made using the 
Major Group 1 classification corresponding to Managers6 based on ISCO-08, the latest recent 
version of the “International Standard Classification of Occupations” produced by the 
International Labour Organization. Occupational Group 2 (professionals)7 are the only group 
which command higher wages than Group 1 and this is only true for the pre-crisis initial wave. 
Group 1 includes a broad range of occupations and the denomination of manager could for 
example, also include a self-employed individual who earns an hourly wage inferior to other 
occupational categories within Group 1 such as a CEO or skilled professionals belonging to Group 
2. In 2004-2007, an individual belonging to Group 2 earned an hourly wage which was 6.18% 
higher than a person in occupational Category 1. Although bearing a positive, but reduced 
coefficient in the 2008-2011 wave, the statistic for Group 2 is not significant suggesting that 
potentially there is less of a difference between the hourly wage of this occupational group and 
Group 1, reflecting perhaps a mixture of effects of the slump and recuperation years. However, in 
the post-crisis wave of 2012-2015, Group 2 occupations now join the other occupational groups 
to display a negative coefficient of 9.07% which is statistically significant at the 1% level. As 
expected, the worse performing occupational group is Group 9 which represents elementary 
occupations usually involving the large bulk of unskilled workers. Their hourly wage is 
consistently negative (with coefficients statistically significant at the 1% level), throughout the 
whole period passing from an hourly wage which is 57.4% lower than Group 1 in the pre-crisis 
period 2004-2007 to one which is 68.6% lower for the final 2012-2015 period. The remaining 
occupational groups all exhibit negative wage spirals, all significant at the 1% level of significance 
and notably, all bearing reduced wages relative to group 1 which are lower in the post-crisis period 
than in the pre-crisis period. In summary, the results indicate that wages have yet to recuperate 
their pre-crisis levels.  
b) Results for the determinants of  (see Table III)  
Once the function of the Mincer Frontier has been estimated, it is possible to analyse the 
determinants of the variance of in line with Equation (9). The determinants of inefficiency  
include characteristics related either to the individual or job, these being the type of contract 
(temporary or permanent), gender, Autonomous Communities and GDP, with dummies included 
for the first three. Table III shows the results for the determinants of . 
Given similar human capital endowments, these results give an indication of the relative levels of 
inefficiency experienced by an individual in being able to obtain his/her potential wage. In other 
words, it is a measure of the distance of an individual`s actual hourly wage to their potential wage 
on the stochastic frontier given their human capital.  
Here one of the determinants of efficiency for the hourly wage is the type of contract, where the 
benchmark chosen for the dummy variable is a fixed indefinite contract. A fixed indefinite 
contract offers some measure of job stability and visible progression to an individual and in this 
context, should facilitate obtaining the right potential wage given that person´s human capital 
characteristics. As can be observed the coefficient for the type of contract dummy bears a positive 
                                                          6 Managers include the following sub-groups: Chief executives, senior officials and legislators; Administrative and commercial managers; Production and specialized services managers; Hospitality, retail and other services managers 7 Professionals include the following sub-groups: Science and engineering professionals; Health professionals; Teaching professionals; Business and administration professionals; Information and communications technology professionals; Legal, social and cultural professionals. Source: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/docs/resol08.pdf  
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sign which is statistically significant throughout the entire period of study 2004-2015. In other 
words, the type of contract influences the individual´s ability to reach his/her potential wage 
given a set of human capital characteristics indicating that an individual with a temporary 
contract has more difficulties than an individual with a fixed contract in attaining his/her 
potential wage.  
The aspect of gender was not incorporated into our estimation of the Mincer equation frontier 
because there are no a priori reasons to expect that gender may influence productivity, meaning 
that both men and women should be able to reach the same wage frontier given their human 
capital. However, due to social and cultural constraints, it is possible that women perform worse 
than men in terms of achieving their potential wage. This would be the case if, for instance, 
females tend to be employed in the lowest ranking jobs within each occupational category (Perez-
Villadóniga and Rodriguez-Álvarez, 2017a).  For this reason, we are interested in checking 
whether, after controlling for human capital endowments and other characteristics of the worker, 
gender is a significant determinant in explaining the distance to the potential frontier. 
Our results indicate that the coefficient Man which denotes the gender determinant of inefficiency 
shows a negative and statistically significant coefficient over the period 2004-2015. This signifies 
that over the three cycles, men with similar human capital to women are always at a greater 
distance from their potential wage frontier than men. 
In line with our comments in Section 1 of this paper, we monitor Spanish GDP (as a % increase), 
for the 3 cyclical periods of our study. In the pre-crisis wave of 2004-2007, GDP displays a 
negative coefficient which is statistically significant at the 1% level. Here, the negative coefficient 
reflects the fact that the distance of an individual’s actual wage to his/her potential wage has 
diminished, that is to say, GDP is essentially improving that person´s ability to attain their 
potential wage, by narrowing the gap between the latter and the actual wage. However, for the 
waves 2008-2011 and 2012-2015 the coefficient for GDP which is again statistically significant at 
the 1% level, adopts the opposite sign becoming positive, indicating that the situation is now 
reversed and the distance between an individual´s actual and potential wage is increasing with a 
resulting increase in the inefficiency of the hourly wage. 
In terms of regions and without going into great detail, the results of hourly wages by Autonomous 
Communities with respect to Madrid are mixed. With the exception of the positive coefficient of 
Castile-La Mancha which is in fact statistically insignificant, the remaining Autonomous 
Communities all display negative coefficients in the pre-crisis period. This means that the wage 
of an individual with given human capital in a region other than Madrid is closer to his or her 
potential wage represented by their relative stochastic frontier as compared with Madrid. A 
positive coefficient denotes an increased distance from the stochastic frontier relative to Madrid 
meaning that individuals are now further away from their potential wage. Galicia and the Basque 
country are the only two Autonomous regions which maintain statistically significant coefficients 
for all three cycles, 10 regions exhibiting statistically non-significant coefficients during the post-
crisis period 2012-15, the latter allowing little room for interpretation. The Basque country 
displays a positive and identical coefficient for the latter two cycles as compared to the negative 
coefficient of the pre-crisis period suggesting that individuals in that region with given human 
capital characteristics experienced more difficulty in obtaining their potential wage i.e. the 
distance from their actual wage to their potential wage has increased relative to a similar 
individual in Madrid where the gap has narrowed.  
This result gives rise to an interesting reflection. On the one hand, as observed in Table II and as 
explained in section 6a, the different regions appear to have a lower potential wage (a lower wage 
frontier) with respect to the reference region, in our case Madrid.  The Autonomous Community 
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of Madrid (and also Barcelona)8 are considered as business and employment hubs and a 
substantial part of the best human capital is concentrated in these regions. This can therefore 
explain why potential wages tend to be higher than in other poorer regions 
After the frontier has been estimated and once our model controls the possibility of a different 
frontier for each region, we are in a position to analyse the distance at which workers find 
themselves from their potential frontier in accordance with equation (9). The results would 
appear to indicate that given their human capital, workers situated below their frontier and 
belonging to the richer regions seem to experience more difficulties in reaching their maximum 
potential wage. The reason could be twofold: on the one hand, as already mentioned, the potential 
wages of these richer regions are higher and, on the other hand, there are more candidates with 
similar human capital endowment characteristics. The upshot of the latter is that not all workers 
can attain work in accordance with their human capital endowment, this resulting in lower wages 
for those not positioned on their maximum potential wage frontier due to difficulties caused by 
the competitive effects of the labour market.  
On the contrary, in the poorer regions the opposite effect occurs as workers face less competition 
which helps them to be closer to their specific (regional) potential wage, which as explained 
previously, is lower than the richer regions. 
 
 
c) Results of EFF indices by Panel  
In order to illustrate the effect of GDP on wages over the period 2004-2015 we report Figures I 
and II and Table IV. Figure I tracks the % change in GDP registered in the Spanish economy for 
the years 2004-2015. Figure II and Table IV indicate the EFF indices calculated for each year 
following Equation (3). Here we recall that these indices measure the distance of a worker from 
their wage frontier and take values between 0 and 1 (1 signifying that the worker has obtained 
their potential wage whilst the further away they are from the value 1 the greater the distance to 
their potential wage given their human capital).  
In the first cycle as the economy increases (see Figure I), EFF indices increase reflecting the fact 
that the distance of an individual’s actual wage to his/her potential wage diminished. However, 
in 2008-2011 and 2012-2015, this is reversed with positive coefficients which reflect a widening 
distance of the gap between actual and potential wages on the frontier. On a region-wide basis 
despite an apparent recuperation of the economy from the crisis it appears that the gap between 
the potential wage and the real wage is increasing, thereby making it more difficult for individuals 
with similar characteristics to attain the former. 
As can easily be observed, in the first two cycles movements in GDP more or less move cyclically 
with mean efficiency. However, from 2012 onwards despite an increase in GDP, mean efficiency 
of wages adopts a downward trend. i.e. as the economy grows the welfare of individuals in terms 
of wages has declined. 
We further illustrate what appears to be an increasing trend in wage inequality over the period 
2004-2015 in Figure III and Table V. In the latter table we calculate the mean EFF indices by 
hourly wage deciles for the period with the most relevant deciles plotted under Figure III. As can 
be observed, the upper deciles 8-10, representing the highest incomes in terms of hourly wages 
are those closest to their respective wage frontiers in terms of efficiency. In fact, their levels of 
efficiency appear to be increasing over the post-crisis period (2012-20I5). This effect is in contrast 
                                                          8 In Table II there is no significant difference in the potential wage frontier between Madrid and Barcelona, but these differences do exist between Madrid and other poorer regions such as the Canary Islands or Extremadura.  
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to the lowest 3 decile groups which after experiencing similar cyclical trends over the pre and 
crisis period see a steep drop in the TE of their mean hourly wage in 2012 which also appears to 
flatten out and even decrease at the end of 2015. The upshot is that these lower income groups of 
individuals are experiencing substantially greater difficulty in attaining their potential wage, this 
evidencing a growing trend in inequality if we compare them with their higher income 
counterparts.  
Table VI shows the EFF indices by type of gender, contract and region. In terms of gender the 
efficiency of men in attaining their potential wage is superior to that of women throughout the 
whole period, albeit the value of the coefficient in tandem with that of women decreases as the 
period progresses. In the period 2012-2015 whilst men are still more efficient than women in 
obtaining their potential salary, they are less efficient at doing this than in the wave 2004-2007. 
Nevertheless, the wage gap appears to remain constant at about 7% in the three periods analysed.  
In Figure IV we have plotted the mean gender EFF indices by hourly wage deciles for the period 
revealing that whatever the decile men are always more efficient than women in attaining their 
potential wage. This being said, both genders appear to be more efficient in the lower half of the 
hourly wage deciles (1-5), suffering a drop at decile 6 which tends to recuperate for the remaining 
higher income deciles (7-10) albeit not reaching the highest values of mean gender EFF achieved 
at decile 4 of 83.6% and 89.1% for women and men, respectively. This suggests that while a 
difference exists between women and men, at the lower end of the wage scale, in potentially more 
basic and less differentiable jobs involving less skills, individuals find it easier to obtain their 
maximum potential wage.        
Likewise, for the three waves and as expected, having a fixed indefinite contract improves the 
efficiency of an individual with a given human capital endowment as compared to a person with 
similar characteristics possessing a temporary contract. Again, for both types of contract the value 
of the EFF indices mean adopts a downward direction and notably, the efficiency of temporary 
contracts falls from a level of 72.7% in the pre-crisis period to a level of 70.54% in the years 2008-
2011 dropping by almost 20% to a level of 56.7% in 2012-20159. This is in line with the evidence 
for Portugal presented in the paper by Fernandes and Ferreira (2017) using linked employer-
employee data for the period 2002-2012. Their study suggests that companies in this country 
resorted to more flexible fixed term (temporary contracts) given the uncertainty unleashed by the 
2008-9 crisis. The upshot was workers earning lower wages, the latter being confirmed by 
empirical research for these types of contracts.  
A similar exercise to that performed for gender was performed using the mean EFF indices by 
hourly wage deciles relating to individuals holding temporary and fixed-term contracts over the 
period 2004-2015. As shown in Figure V, individuals with fixed term contracts command higher 
levels of efficiency for all the wage deciles in comparison with those possessing temporary 
contracts. Interestingly however, individuals on fixed contracts belonging to the lower wage 
groups (deciles 1-4) are on average, closer to their potential wage frontiers than those in higher 
wage brackets. Also, noteworthy, is the tendency for individuals on temporary contracts at the 
higher end of the wage scale (deciles 7-10), to achieve mean levels of efficiency which are on 
average almost at a par with their fixed-term counterparts. This probably reflects the fact that 
more specialized, skilled or managerial jobs, command superior hourly wages and there may be 
less abundance of these higher profile individuals in the labour market, thus closing the wage gap 
inequality between these temporary and other comparable full-time workers. Likewise, certain 
                                                          9 Government reforms took place in 2012 aimed at boosting the creation of permanent jobs with fixed contracts and improved conditions for temporary jobs. It is beyond the scope of this paper both in terms of our objective and the database available to us to analyse in detail the effects of the afore-mentioned government reforms. However, our empirical results do suggest that in terms of hourly wage it became more difficult for individuals to attain their potential wage and this proved more accentuated for those workers with temporary contracts particularly in the last cycle where the difference in their EFF indices more than doubles from 10% to 21% as compared with full-time workers. 
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occupations, for example, consultancy, tend to perform projects over determined periods of time 
and in many instances resort to highly technical specialist staff on a temporary basis.      
On a regional basis, in terms of EFF indices the scenario is similar to gender and type of contract 
in that all the Autonomous Communities display lower efficiencies at the end of the period. In 
2004-2005 Galicia ranked top with an index of 82.97%, followed closely by Canary Islands, La 
Rioja, the Basque Country and the Community of Valencia. Noticeably the major cities Madrid 
and Barcelona display lower EFF closer to the worse performer Castile-La Mancha with an index 
of 75.8%. The cities which the Autonomous Communities of Madrid and Barcelona embrace are 
considered as business and employment hubs, with an abundance of candidates with similar 
capital endowment characteristics. The latter may indeed serve to reduce wages because of the 
competitive effects making it more difficult for individuals to attain their maximum potential 
hourly wage.  
The period 2008-2011 offers a mix of results possibly because these years cover the crisis and 
recuperation phase of the economy. Madrid, together with Cantabria, Castile and Leon, Castile –
La Mancha, Foral community of Navarra actually improve EFF. La Rioja is the best performer 
with a EFF of 82.4% whilst Andalusia holds the lowest EFF score with a EFF of 74.7%.  
However, in the period 2012-2015 the situation changes drastically with none of the Autonomous 
Communities achieving efficiency scores superior to the EFF of Aragon at 77.15%. Nevertheless, 
three regions register EFF indices in the range of 64-69%, Asturias obtaining the lowest EFF at 
64.6%. This being said, none of the Autonomous Communities achieve their 2004-2007 levels of 
EFF for hourly wages. 
 
3. Conclusions 
In summary, the study reveals that individuals with a given human capital endowment such as 
years of education and work experience (characteristics generally accepted in theoretical and 
empirical literature), working in a determined occupation and living in any of the Spanish regions 
experienced more difficulty in attaining their potential wage during the post-crisis period than in 
the pre-crisis period. More precisely, controlling for region, gender and type of contract, the 
individuals of the survey have more difficulties in achieving their potential hourly wage at the end 
of the 2012-2015 wave than in the initial wave of the survey.  
The merit of our paper lies in the use of a stochastic frontier estimation of the Mincer equation 
which covers a relevant and extended cyclical period (2004-2015) not only for Spain but most of 
the world economies. Moreover, the empirical model is based on the true random-effects model 
(Greene, 2005) which allows us to separate time-varying inefficiency from individual (worker) 
specific time invariant unobserved heterogeneity. On the other hand, using control dummies for 
the Autonomous Communities, gender, GDP and type of contract (temporary or permanent), we 
are able to explain the difficulty that Spanish workers have in attaining their maximum hourly 
wage based on their human capital endowment. Also, we reveal that this difficulty has increased 
over the period of time analysed.   
Given our interest in the cyclical effect of the Spanish economy for the years of our study, we 
monitor the effects of GDP on hourly wage, revealing that whilst the economy reveals signs of 
economic recuperation in the period 2012-2015, the difference between observed and potential 
hourly wage has adopted a downward and opposite trend. Also, our analysis by hourly wage 
deciles reveals an increasing trend in inequality for the period 2012-2015. Whilst individuals in 
the higher hourly wage deciles seem to be commanding seemingly increasing levels of efficiency 
i.e. they are becoming closer to their wage frontiers, the exact opposite is true for individuals in 
the lowest deciles who appear to experience ever greater difficulties in attaining their potential 
wage. In a nutshell, our findings reveal increased inequality in hourly wages. 
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The results of our paper should not be considered in isolation to our European neighbours. In a 
recent report by the Centre for Economic Policy Research, the authors Weisbrot and Merling, 
(2018) highlight aspects of hourly wages, inequality and welfare, amongst other issues for the UK. 
Their findings which cover an extended period similar to that of the present study reveal a pattern 
comparable to our own results for Spain. More precisely in their discussion of inequality, the 
authors refer to long-term rising inequality with a redistribution of income to the upper 
percentiles, real hourly median wages which continue to be 5% below their 2009 peak, both of 
these accompanied by an increase of persons on the poverty line as well as one of the worse levels 
of regional inequality in the European Union. And all of this in the face of a scenario with one of 
the lowest rates of unemployment in the European Union. As regards hourly earnings by sex, 
there also appears to be a narrowing of the gender gap attributable, say the authors, not so much 
to women “catching up” but to the fact that the wages of males have fallen faster than females 
since 2009.  
        
All the foregoing serves to ratify the findings of the ILO mentioned in Section 1 and confirm to 
some extent the lag in the recuperation of hourly wages to pre-crisis levels as well as the elements 
of inequality present in so many developed economies. If this is the case and referring once again 
to the ILO Global Wage Report 14/15, insofar as the analysis of our study permits, Spanish 
individuals and households face an important but unequal welfare loss, in that those individuals 
belonging to higher income groups fare better than those in lower income groups i.e. growing 
inequality in attaining potential hourly wages.   
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Table I. Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
Table 1a: Continuous variables 
 
 
 
Table 1b: Time Dummies 
 
 
Panel 2004-2007
Variable Obs Mean Std.Err. Min Max
Wage per hour 18163 9.29 7.0624 0.0431 231.94
Work experience 18163 18.10 11.8538 0 63
Years of education 18163 13.84 4.0860 0 19
GDP 18163 3.85 0.3502 3.2 4.2
Panel 2008-2011
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Wage per hour 22801 11.11 8.0549 0.0402 338.07
Work experience 22801 19.22 11.3999 0.0 60
Years of education 22801 14.42 4.0332 0.0 19.00
GDP 22801 -0.99 1.5960 -3.6 1.1
Panel 2012-2015
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Wage per hour 19009 12.09 9.7020 0.0102 341.20
Work experience 19009 20.85 11.2605 0 59
Years of education 19009 14.77 4.0313 0 19
GDP 19009 0.72 2.2414 -2.9 3.2
Year of survey Obs Percent
2004 2,761 15.2
2005 5,539 30.5
2006 7,600 41.84
2007 2,263 12.46
Total 18,163 100
Year of survey Obs Percent
2008 3,142 13.78
2009 5,413 23.74
2010 7,626 33.45
2011 6,620 29.03
Total 22,801 100
Year of survey Obs Percent
2012 2,389 12.57
2013 4,273 22.48
2014 6,466 34.02
2015 5,881 30.94
Total 19,009 100
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Table 1c: Gender 
 
 
 
 
Table 1d: Regions 
 
 
 
 
Table 1e: Type of contract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panels
Gender Obs. Percent Obs. Percent Obs. Percent
Woman 7,599 41.84 10,675 46.82 9,202 48.41
Man 10,564 58.16 12,126 53.18 9,807 51.59
Total 18,163 100 22,801 100 19,009 100
2004-2007 2008-2011 2012-2015
Panels
Region Obs. Percent Obs. Percent Obs. Percent
Madrid 1,343 7.39 2,695 11.82 2,379 12.52
Galicia 1,172 6.45 1,505 6.6 1,254 6.6
Principality of Asturias 684 3.77 906 3.97 665 3.5
Cantabria 434 2.39 677 2.97 451 2.37
Basque Country 932 5.13 1,437 6.3 1,348 7.09
Foral Commu. of Navarra 774 4.26 861 3.78 772 4.06
La Rioja 554 3.05 851 3.73 601 3.16
Aragon 828 4.56 1,082 4.75 891 4.69
Castile and Leon 1,150 6.33 1,506 6.6 1,136 5.98
Castile-La Mancha 894 4.92 1,124 4.93 726 3.82
Extremadura 698 3.84 720 3.16 676 3.56
Catalonia 2,321 12.78 2,591 11.36 2,378 12.51
Community Valencia 1,617 8.9 1,725 7.57 1,469 7.73
Balearic Islands 803 4.42 874 3.83 841 4.42
Andalusia 2,092 11.52 2,285 10.02 1,913 10.06
Region of Murcia 899 4.95 859 3.77 804 4.23
Canary Islands 968 5.33 1,103 4.84 705 3.71
Total 18,163 100 22,801 100 19,009 100
2004-2007 2008-2011 2012-2015
Panels
Type of contract Obs. Percent Obs. Percent Obs. Percent
Fixed indefinite contract 13,279 73.11 18,051 79.17 14,741 77.55
Temporary contract 4,884 26.89 4,750 20.83 4,268 22.45
Total 18,163 100 22,801 100 19,009 100
2004-2007 2008-2011 2012-2015
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Table 1f: Type of occupation 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1g: Occupational classifications 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panels
Type of occupation Obs. Percent Obs. Percent Obs. Percent
Managers 366 2.02 573 2.51 458 2.41
Professionals 2,516 13.85 4,137 18.14 3,352 17.63
Technicians & associate professionals 1,891 10.41 2,361 10.35 2,415 12.7
Clerical support workers 2,422 13.33 3,393 14.88 2,916 15.34
Services & sales workers 2,831 15.59 3,809 16.71 3,450 18.15
Skilled,agricultural, forestry & fishery workers 252 1.39 270 1.18 275 1.45
Craft & related trade workers 3,234 17.81 2,821 12.37 2,074 10.91
Plant & Machine operators & assemblers 1,525 8.4 2,259 9.91 1,391 7.32
Elementary(unskilled) occupations 2,993 16.48 3,024 13.26 2,549 13.41
Armed Forces occupations 133 0.73 154 0.68 129 0.68
Total 18,163 100 22,801 100 19,009 100
2004-2007 2008-2011 2012-2015
Type of occupation (ISCO-08) classification Our classification
Managers 1 Occup 1
Professionals 2 Occup 2
Technicians & associate professionals 3 Occup 3
Clerical support workers 4 Occup 4
Services & sales workers 5 Occup 5
Skilled,agricultural, forestry & fishery workers 6 Occup 6
Craft & related trade workers 7 Occup 7
Plant & Machine operators & assemblers 8 Occup 8
Elementary(unskilled) occupations 9 Occup 9
Armed Forces occupations 0 Occup 10
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Table II. Mincer Equations estimated for hourly wage 
 
 
* The reference Autonomous Community is Madrid. As regard occupations, Group 1 (managers) is the 
reference group.  
 
 
 
 
 
F RONTIER F RONTIER F RONTIER
Coef. t-statistic Probability Coef. t-statistic Probability Coef. t-statistic Probability
Exp 0.0224 21.09 0.0000 Exp 0.0229 21.93 0.0000 Exp 0.0078 5.14 0.0000
Exp2 -0.0003 -12.58 0.0000 Exp2 -0.0003 -13.54 0.0000 Exp2 0.0000 -0.92 0.3560
Ed 0.0234 19.26 0.0000 Ed 0.0228 18.55 0.0000 Ed 0.0153 10.34 0.0000
D2005 0.0313 3.58 0.0000 D2009 0.0227 2.64 0.0080 D2013 -0.0425 -6.98 0.0000
D2006 0.0608 5.71 0.0000 D2010 0.0663 9.54 0.0000 D2014 -0.0356 -5.43 0.0000
D2007 0.1156 11.23 0.0000 D2011 0.0473 6.41 0.0000 D2015 -0.0259 -3.59 0.0000
Galicia -0.2473 -9.3 0.0000 Galicia -0.1888 -9.24 0.0000 Galicia -0.1885 -6.61 0.0000
Princ. of Asturias -0.0534 -1.72 0.0850 Princ. of Asturias -0.0260 -1.03 0.3050 Princ. of Asturias 0.1383 3.16 0.0020
Cantabria 0.0150 0.41 0.6820 Cantabria -0.1233 -4.43 0.0000 Cantabria -0.0740 -1.94 0.0520
Basque Country 0.0279 1.01 0.3140 Basque Country 0.0723 3.39 0.0010 Basque Country 0.3320 11.42 0.0000
F.C.Navarra 0.1100 3.58 0.0000 F.C.Navarra 0.0965 3.85 0.0000 F.C.Navarra 0.0905 2.28 0.0230
La Rioja -0.0926 -2.82 0.0050 La Rioja -0.1106 -4.44 0.0000 La Rioja 0.0023 0.07 0.9480
Aragon -0.0191 -0.66 0.5070 Aragon -0.0363 -1.54 0.1240 Aragon -0.0562 -1.93 0.0530
Castile and Leon -0.0743 -2.81 0.0050 Castile and Leon -0.0395 -1.96 0.0500 Castile and Leon 0.0590 1.76 0.0790
Castile-La Mancha -0.0496 -1.74 0.0810 Castile-La Mancha -0.0777 -3.39 0.0010 Castile-La Mancha -0.1159 -3.33 0.0010
Extremadura -0.1715 -5.6 0.0000 Extremadura -0.1946 -7.22 0.0000 Extremadura -0.2465 -6.56 0.0000
Catalonia -0.0048 -0.21 0.8330 Catalonia 0.0045 0.26 0.7980 Catalonia -0.0106 -0.41 0.6800
C.Valencia -0.1707 -6.89 0.0000 C.Valencia -0.1025 -5.21 0.0000 C.Valencia -0.0881 -3.05 0.0020
Balearic Islands 0.0106 0.36 0.7180 Balearic Islands -0.0266 -1.05 0.2930 Balearic Islands -0.0703 -2.04 0.0420
Andalusia -0.0989 -4.25 0.0000 Andalusia -0.0166 -0.9 0.3670 Andalusia -0.0849 -3.21 0.0010
R. Murcia -0.0832 -2.96 0.0030 R. Murcia -0.1051 -4.21 0.0000 R. Murcia -0.2286 -7.01 0.0000
Canary Islands -0.1820 -6.66 0.0000 Canary Islands -0.1382 -5.96 0.0000 Canary Islands -0.2294 -6.36 0.0000
Occup 2 0.0618 2.26 0.0240 Occup 2 0.0334 1.32 0.1860 Occup 2 -0.0907 -2.75 0.0060
Occup 3 -0.2531 -9.21 0.0000 Occup 3 -0.2485 -9.56 0.0000 Occup 3 -0.3746 -10.86 0.0000
Occup 4 -0.3459 -12.67 0.0000 Occup 4 -0.3939 -15.44 0.0000 Occup 4 -0.4183 -12.67 0.0000
Occup  5 -0.5128 -18.6 0.0000 Occup  5 -0.5218 -20.29 0.0000 Occup  5 -0.6398 -18.95 0.0000
Occup 6 -0.6287 -15.5 0.0000 Occup 6 -0.5933 -14.83 0.0000 Occup 6 -0.7261 -14.65 0.0000
Occup 7 -0.4656 -16.96 0.0000 Occup7 -0.4524 -17.16 0.0000 Occup7 -0.5888 -16.74 0.0000
Occup 8 -0.4049 -14.06 0.0000 Occup 8 -0.4481 -16.7 0.0000 Occup 8 -0.5904 -15.57 0.0000
Occup 9 -0.5739 -20.65 0.0000 Occup 9 -0.5814 -21.92 0.0000 Occup 9 -0.6855 -19.63 0.0000
Occup 10 -0.2293 -4.48 0.0000 Occup 10 -0.2129 -4.25 0.0000 Occup 10 -0.2681 -3.12 0.0020
Constant 2.0824 52.19 0.0000 Constant 2.2420 62.25 0.0000 Constant 2.7492 60.13 0.0000
PANEL 2004/2007 PANEL 2008/2011 PANEL 2012/2015
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Table III. σu2 determinants 
 
 
* The reference Autonomous Community is Madrid. As regard occupations, Group 1 (managers) is the 
reference group.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coef. t-statistic Probability Coef. t-statistic Probability Coef. t-statistic Probability
Temporary Contract 1.2319 23.51 0.0000 Temporary Contract 1.1752 26.17 0.0000  Temporary Contract 2.3895 53.57 0.0000
GDP -0.2176 -2.46 0.0140 GDP 0.1038 7.14 0.0000 GDP 0.0400 4.22 0.0000
Galicia -1.0678 -5.9 0.0000 Galicia -0.5757 -4.57 0.0000 Galicia -0.2118 -2.00 0.0460
Prin.of Asturias -0.3763 -2.04 0.0420 Prin.of Asturias -0.1341 -0.96 0.3350 Prin.of Asturias -0.1838 -1.31 0.1890
Cantabria -0.2644 -1.19 0.2360 Cantabria -0.6416 -3.7 0.0000 Cantabria -0.0714 -0.46 0.6480
Basque country -0.8161 -4.26 0.0000 Basque country 0.2092 1.88 0.0600 Basque country 0.2902 2.90 0.0040
F.C.Navarra -0.2185 -1.25 0.2100 F.C.Navarra -0.2693 -1.96 0.0500 F.C.Navarra -0.3903 -3.10 0.0020
La Rioja -0.8315 -3.72 0.0000 La Rioja -0.5606 -3.8 0.0000 La Rioja -0.1284 -0.96 0.3360
Aragon -0.5412 -2.96 0.0030 Aragon 0.0417 0.34 0.7360 Aragon -0.4170 -3.45 0.0010
Castile & Leon -0.4183 -2.68 0.0070 Castile & Leon -0.5380 -4.54 0.0000 Castile & Leon 0.0433 0.40 0.6890
Castile-La Mancha 0.2018 1.32 0.1880 Castile-La Mancha -0.2653 -2.1 0.0360 Castile-La Mancha -0.1009 -0.79 0.4300
Extremadura -0.5700 -3.06 0.0020 Extremadura 0.0126 0.09 0.9280 Extremadura -0.1979 -1.51 0.1310
Catalonia -0.4121 -3.05 0.0020 Catalonia 0.0740 0.76 0.4450 Catalonia -0.0117 -0.13 0.8930
C.Valencia -0.7451 -4.7 0.0000 C.Valencia -0.1962 -1.8 0.0730 C.Valencia 0.1969 2.02 0.0430
Balearic Islands -0.6905 -3.67 0.0000 Balearic Islands -0.0612 -0.44 0.6600 Balearic Islands 0.0836 0.72 0.4710
Andalusia -0.5841 -4.21 0.0000 Andalusia 0.3043 3.19 0.0010 Andalusia -0.0195 -0.21 0.8310
Reg. Murcia -0.3455 -2.11 0.0350 Reg. Murcia -0.1365 -1.02 0.3060 Reg. Murcia -0.2489 -2.05 0.0400
Canary Islands -0.9795 -5.16 0.0000 Canary Islands 0.1320 1.1 0.2700 Canary Islands 0.1165 0.92 0.3600
Man -0.7344 -13.94 0.0000 Man -0.5177 -12.28 0.0000 Man -0.3673 -8.86 0.0000
constant -1.5619 -4.44 0.0000 constant -2.6242 -35.81 0.0000 constant -2.8328 -42.28 0.0000
PANEL 2004/2007 PANEL 2008/2011 PANEL 2012/2015
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Table IV. Mean EFF indices of hourly wage per % annual change in GDP 
 
 
Table V. Mean EFF indices of hourly wage by deciles and year 
 
  
YEAR TE MEAN GDP
2004 0.7929 3.2
2005 0.8005 3.7
2006 0.8042 4.2
2007 0.7984 3.8
2008 0.7552 1.1
2009 0.8037 -3.6
2010 0.7838 0
2011 0.7950 -1
2012 0.7439 -2.9
2013 0.7436 -1.7
2014 0.7315 1.4
2015 0.7120 3.2
year decile 1 decile 2 decile 3 decile 4 decile 5 decile 6 decile 7 decile 8 decile 9 decile 10
2004 0.5112 0.7078 0.7635 0.7978 0.8289 0.8542 0.8587 0.8789 0.9018 0.9296
2005 0.5073 0.7023 0.7686 0.8058 0.8300 0.8485 0.8695 0.8836 0.8997 0.9279
2006 0.4932 0.6997 0.7694 0.8007 0.8298 0.8527 0.8669 0.8814 0.8972 0.9287
2007 0.4161 0.6904 0.7383 0.7908 0.8062 0.8367 0.8580 0.8742 0.8898 0.9209
2008 0.4276 0.6735 0.7487 0.7940 0.8194 0.8345 0.8606 0.8857 0.9001 0.9355
2009 0.5002 0.7040 0.7745 0.7967 0.8270 0.8558 0.8688 0.8878 0.9039 0.9368
2010 0.4401 0.6586 0.7382 0.7730 0.8105 0.8282 0.8501 0.8682 0.8903 0.9281
2011 0.4568 0.6653 0.7397 0.7871 0.8137 0.8404 0.8525 0.8719 0.8922 0.9307
2012 0.2395 0.5011 0.6240 0.7140 0.7773 0.8154 0.8501 0.8834 0.9204 0.9665
2013 0.2481 0.5202 0.6259 0.7283 0.7832 0.8224 0.8588 0.8861 0.9171 0.9678
2014 0.2436 0.5080 0.6293 0.7207 0.7744 0.8188 0.8566 0.8819 0.9242 0.9677
2015 0.2395 0.4913 0.6147 0.6989 0.7571 0.8030 0.8556 0.8782 0.9185 0.9659
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Table VI A.  EFF indices by panel (2004/2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PANEL 2004/2007 Obs Mean Std. Err.
Woman 7599 0.7570 0.0019 0.7533 0.7608
Man 10564 0.8320 0.0013 0.8295 0.8345
PANEL 2004/2007 Obs Mean Std. Err.
Fixed indefinite contract 13,279 0.8279 0.0011 0.8257 0.8301
Temporary contract 4,884 0.7265 0.0027 0.7213 0.7318
REGION Obs Mean Std. Err.
Madrid 1,343 0.7719 0.0044 0.7633
Galicia 1,172 0.8297 0.0040 0.8218
Principality of Asturias 684 0.7976 0.0061 0.7856
Cantabria 434 0.7855 0.0080 0.7698
Basque Country 932 0.8224 0.0047 0.8133 0.8315
Foral Commu. of Navarra 774 0.7732 0.0060 0.7614 0.7850
La Rioja 554 0.8236 0.0055 0.8128 0.8345
Aragon 828 0.8079 0.0052 0.7977 0.8182
Castile and Leon 1,150 0.8083 0.0043 0.7998
Castile-La Mancha 894 0.7577 0.0058 0.7462 0.7691
Extremadura 698 0.7893 0.0060 0.7775
Catalonia 2,321 0.7984 0.0032 0.7921 0.8047
Community of Valencia 1,617 0.8182 0.0034 0.8115 0.8250
Balearic Islands 803 0.8115 0.0050 0.8018 0.8213
Andalusia 2,092 0.7949 0.0034 0.7882 0.8017
Region of Murcia 899 0.7855 0.0053 0.7752 0.7959
Canary Islands 968 0.8283 0.0041 0.8202 0.8364
0.8169
0.8011
0.7805
0.8375
0.8095
0.8013
(95%  Conf. Interval)
(95%  Conf. Interval)
(95%  Conf. Interval)
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Table VI B. EFF indices by panel (2008/2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PANEL 2008/2011 Obs Mean Std. Err.
Woman 10,675 0.7538 0.0017 0.7505 0.7572
Man 12,126 0.8177 0.0014 0.8150 0.8205
PANEL 2008/2011 Obs Mean Std. Err.
Fixed indefinite contract 18,051 0.8095 0.0011 0.8073 0.8117
Temporary contract 4,750 0.7054 0.0030 0.6996 0.7113
REGION Obs Mean Std. Err.
Madrid 2,695 0.7816 0.0032 0.7752 0.7880
Galicia 1,505 0.8195 0.0038 0.8120 0.8270
Principality of Asturias 906 0.7827 0.0054 0.7721 0.7934
Cantabria 677 0.8137 0.0061 0.8018 0.8257
Basque Country 1,437 0.7673 0.0047 0.7580 0.7766
Foral Commu. of Navarra 861 0.8020 0.0055 0.7912 0.8127
La Rioja 851 0.8236 0.0049 0.8140 0.8332
Aragon 1,082 0.7886 0.0051 0.7786 0.7986
Castile and Leon 1,506 0.8155 0.0038 0.8079
Castile-La Mancha 1,124 0.8023 0.0047 0.7930 0.8116
Extremadura 720 0.7739 0.0069 0.7603 0.7876
Catalonia 2,591 0.7784 0.0032 0.7721 0.7848
Community of Valencia 1,725 0.8029 0.0038 0.7955 0.8102
Balearic Islands 874 0.7798 0.0056 0.7688 0.7909
Andalusia 2,285 0.7466 0.0040 0.7387 0.7545
Region of Murcia 859 0.7943 0.0055 0.7836 0.8051
Canary Islands 1,103 0.7770 0.0051 0.7669 0.7871
0.8230
(95%  Conf. Interval)
(95%  Conf. Interval)
(95%  Conf. Interval)
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Table VI C. EFF indices by panel (2012/2015) 
 
 
 
  
PANEL 2012/2015 Obs Mean Std. Err.
WOMAN 9,202 0.6925 0.0025 0.6876 0.6973
MAN 9,807 0.7647 0.0024 0.7600 0.7694
PANEL 2012/2015 Obs Mean Std. Err. (95%  Conf. Interval)
Fixed indefinite contract 14,741 0.7768 0.0017 0.7735 0.7800
Temporary contract 4,268 0.5673 0.0043 0.5588 0.5758
REGION Obs Mean Std. Err. (95%  Conf. Interval)
Madrid 2,379 0.7379 0.0048 0.7285 0.7474
Galicia 1,254 0.7572 0.0065 0.7445 0.7699
Principality of Asturias 665 0.6463 0.0093 0.6280 0.6646
Cantabria 451 0.7308 0.0110 0.7093 0.7524
Basque Country 1,348 0.7071 0.0063 0.6947 0.7194
Foral Commu. of Navarra 772 0.7617 0.0079 0.7463 0.7772
La Rioja 601 0.7362 0.0092 0.7182 0.7543
Aragon 891 0.7715 0.0075 0.7568 0.7861
Castile and Leon 1,136 0.6876 0.0070 0.6739 0.7014
Castile-La Mancha 726 0.7439 0.0088 0.7267 0.7612
Extremadura 676 0.7167 0.0100 0.6970 0.7363
Catalonia 2,378 0.7524 0.0047 0.7432 0.7616
Community of Valencia 1,469 0.7272 0.0062 0.7150 0.7394
Balearic Islands 841 0.7455 0.0082 0.7294 0.7616
Andalusia 1,913 0.6990 0.0061 0.6869 0.7110
Region of Murcia 804 0.7423 0.0088 0.7251 0.7595
Canary Islands 705 0.7259 0.0100 0.7062 0.7456
(95%  Conf. Interval)
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Figure I. 
 
Source of GDP data : http://www.datosmacro.com/pib/espana 
 
 
Figure II 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Figure III 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
Figure IV 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Figure V 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
 
